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THE MAKE-WHOLE REMEDY: CALIFORNIA'S
AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DEALS WITH REFUSALS TO BARGAIN
INTRODUCTION
Since April 26, 1978,' the California Agricultural Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter ALRB or Board) has been exercis-
ing the express authority granted to it under the Alatorre-
Zenovich-Dunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of
19752 (hereinafter ALRA or Act) to invoke a unique and power-
ful remedy in cases where employers of organized farm workers
have unlawfully refused to bargain with a certified bargaining
representative. Section 1160.3 of the ALRA provides, in rele-
vant part:
If, upon the preponderence of the testimony taken, the
board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair
labor practice, the board shall state its findings of fact and
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order
requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair
labor practice, to take affirmative action, including rein-
statement of employees with or without backpay, and
making employees whole, when the board deems such re-
lief appropriate, for the loss of pay resulting from the em-
ployer's refusal to bargain, and to provide such other relief
as will effectuate the policies of this part.3
Under this section, the ALRB has been ordering employers to
compensate their employees for economic losses incurred as a
result of being denied an opportunity to participate in, or bene-
fit from, collective bargaining.' This has become known as the
© 1979 by John A. Schlosser.
1. On that date, the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board handed down
the two landmark decisions that form the foundation for this comment: Adam Dairy,
4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 (Apr. 26, 1978) and Perry Farms, Inc., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25 (Apr. 26,
1978) rev'd and remanded, 86 Cal. App. 3d 448, 150 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
2. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3 (West Supp. 1979).
3. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
4. Section 1153 of the ALRA provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an agricultural employer to do any of the following: . . . (e) To refuse to bargain
collectively in good faith with labor organizations certified pursuant to [the Act]
.... "CAL. LAB. CODE § 1153 (West Supp. 1979).
The ALRB has found violations of § 1153(e) and has ordered the make-whole
remedy in at least 12 cases since Adam Dairy and Perry Farms: Sunnyside Nurseries,
Inc., 5 A.L.R.B. No. 23 (Mar. 27, 1979); John F. Adam, Jr., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 76 (Oct.
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''make-whole" remedy.
A controversy exists with regard to the application of this
remedy. Critics of the Board policy, including the
grower/employers, argue that precise legislative intent is diffi-
cult to ascertain and that the language of the statute is ambig-
uous. They believe that the make-whole remedy should be
more discriminately applied in cases involving a refusal to bar-
gain. The ALRB and the farm workers' representatives, on the
other hand, view the current policy of awarding make-whole as
completely within the statutory scheme and necessary for the
effectuation of the purposes of the Act. Additional confusion
has resulted because the ALRB is directed to follow the appli-
cable precedents of the National Labor Relations Act5 (here-
inafter NLRA), which has no explicit authority to make em-
ployees whole in similar cases.'
The Supreme Court of the State of California has agreed
to hear two companion cases in which the ALRB's application
of the make-whole remedy is at issue.7 These cases will require
the court to address roughly four recurring criticisms of the
Board's practices. Critics contend, first, that the Board is abus-
ing its discretion by failing to distinguish the cases where an
employer refuses to bargain in order to challenge Board certifi-
cation of a union as the bargaining agent' from those cases
where an employer is merely seeking to delay bargaining by
whatever means are available. This lack of discrimination, it
20, 1978); Robert H. Hickam, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 73 (Oct. 19, 1978); Romar Carrot Co., 4
A.L.R.B. No. 56 (Aug. 18, 1978); Kyutoku Nursery, Inc., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 55 (Aug. 8,
1978); George Arakelian Farms, Inc., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 53 (July 21, 1978); C. Mondavi
& Sons, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 52 (July 21, 1978); High & Mighty Farms, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 51
(July 22, 1978); Waller Flowerseed Co., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 49 (July 19, 1978); D'Arrigo
Bros., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 45 (July 14, 1978); Superior Farming Co., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44
(July 13, 1978); J.R. Norton Co., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 39 (June 22, 1978).
5. ALRA § 1148 provides: "The board shall follow applicable precedents of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1148 (West Supp. 1979).
It should be pointed out that the supreme court has ruled that the ALRB is not bound
by any particular practice of the federal agency. ALRB v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d
392, 546 P.2d 687, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1976).
6. Compare CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1979) (see text accompanying
note 3 supra) with 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
7. J.R. Norton Co. v. ALRB, 4 Civ. 20365, hearing granted, Sup. Ct. Case No.
L.A. 31027 (Sept. 20, 1978); High & Mighty Farms v. ALRB, 4 Civ. 20452, hearing
granted, Sup. Ct. Case No. L.A. 31030 (Sept. 27, 1978).
8. The text refers to the only route by which an employer may obtain judicial
review of Board certification of a bargaining representative. This procedure is dis-
cussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 23-28 infra. See also CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 1156.3(c), 1160.8 (West Supp. 1979).
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is argued, "chills" the employer's right to judicial review.? Sec-
ond, the award of make-whole, extraordinary remedy that it is,
requires a showing of subjective bad faith on the part of the
employer who engages in the unfair labor practice merely as a
prerequisite for judicial review.'0 Third, applicable precedent of
the NLRA prohibits any scheme by which make-whole is or-
dered in every case where an employer is found to be in viola-
tion of the duty to bargain." And fourth, the award of make-
whole contravenes section 1155.2"of the Act by intruding into
the negotiating process."
The purpose of this comment is to explore these challenges
to the ALRB procedure and the rebuttals to them. More pre-
cisely, it will concentrate on the remedy as it has been applied
in cases where the employer commits a "technical" section
1153(e) violation.'3 The author concludes that the Board policy
of ordering the make-whole remedy is both logical and lawful.
THE BOARD'S FIRST IMPRESSION
The ALRB announced its policy for the application of the
make-whole remedy in Adam Dairy," and Perry Farms, Inc. ",
Both cases were decided on the same day. Adam Dairy was the
first opportunity for the Board to deal with a violation of sec-
tion 1153(e) of the Act (an unlawful refusal to bargain in good
faith).'6 The Board concluded "that the remedy [make-whole]
should be applied in any case in which employees suffer a loss
of pay as a result of an employer's refusal to bargain."" In fact,
9. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 43-64 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 66-77 and accompanying text infra.
13. A "technical" violation of § 1153(e) is a refusal to bargain intended to trigger
judicial review of a board certification. The ALRB cases involving this type of violation
are listed in note 4 supra. Only Romar Carrot Co. and John F. Adam, Jr. involve
variant § 1153(e) violations. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1153(e) (West Supp. 1979).
14. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 (Apr. 26, 1978).
15. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25 (Apr. 26, 1978). The order of the ALRB in Perry Farms,
Inc. was entirely set aside by the court of appeal on Nov. 17, 1978 and the cause
remanded to the Board for further proceedings. The court, however, expressed no
opinion with respect to the Board's general practice of awarding make-whole. Perry
Farms, Inc. v. ALRB, 86 Cal. App. 3d 448, 150 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
16. Adam Dairy was held to have violated the labor code by its failure to provide
information requested by the union for bargaining purposes, numerous unilateral
changes in employment practices including pay rate changes and wage increases,
failure to make meaningful counter-proposals, and refusal to bargain in good faith. 4
A.L.R.B. No. 24, slip op. at 3-4.
17. Id. at 6.
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the ALRB has applied the remedy in each and every case since
Adam Dairy and Perry Farms where it has found a violation of
section 1153(e).'1
There are many different situations in which an employer
can be found to have violated the proscription against refusing
to bargain.'" Perhaps the least egregious of these is the em-
ployer's "technical" refusal to bargain in order to obtain judi-
cial review of the certification process.20 It is the application of
the remedy in these cases that has spawned most of the objec-
tions. And some of the most thought-provoking criticism has
come from within the membership of the Board."
"TECHNICAL" VIOLATIONS AND MAKE-WHOLE
One objection to the invocation of the make-whole remedy
was highlighted in an administrative law officer's (ALO) rec-
ommendation to the Board in the case of Superior Farming
Co.22 The recommendation preceded the ALRB's ruling in
Adam Dairy and Perry Farms and announced that, 'under the
circumstances of Superior Farming, the make-whole remedy
18. See generally cases cited note 4 supra.
19. See, e.g., note 16 supra.
20. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
21. ALRB Member McCarthy has dissented or filed a separate concurring opin-
ion in most cases where the majority invoked make-whole for a violation of labor code
§ 1153(e). Particularly noteworthy are the McCarthy concurrence in Perry Farms, Inc.,
4 A.L.R.B. No. 25, slip op. at 25, and his dissent in Superior Farming Co., 4 A.L.R.B.
No. 44, slip op. at 12.
22. No. 77-CE-33-1-D (Dec. 3, 1977) (appended to 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44 (July 13,
1978)). The authority of the ALO comes from § 1142(b) of the Act that provides:
Besides the principal office in Sacramento, as provided in subdivi-
sion (a), the board may establish offices in such other cities as it shall
deem necessary. The board may delegate to the personnel of these offices
such powers as it deems appropriate for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing, to investigate and provide for hearings, to determine whether a ques-
tion of representation exists, to direct an election by a secret ballot pur-
suant to the provisions of Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1156), and
to certify the results of such election, and to investigate, conduct hearings
and make determinations relating to unfair labor practices. The board
may review any action taken pursuant to the authority delegated under
this section upon a request for a review of such action filed with the board
by an interested party. Any such review made by the board shall not,
unless specifically ordered by the board, operate as a stay of any action
taken. The entire record considered by the board in considering or acting
upon any such request or review shall be made available to all parties
prior to such consideration or action, and the board's findings and action
thereon shall be published as a decision of the board.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1142(b) (West Supp. 1979).
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was not appropriate.23 The ALO reasoned that a good-faith
challenge to Board certification should not warrant the imposi-
tion of make-whole.
Superior Farming is distinguishable from other refusal-to-
bargain cases that were pending before the ALRB at the time
of the recommendation. None of the latter cases24 involved an
employer's refusal to bargain in order to obtain judicial review
of the Board's certification process as provided in section
1160.8 of the Act.25 The distinction comes to this: the certifica-
tion process may be challenged by an employer who follows the
procedure outlined in section 1156.3(c), that provides, inter
alia, 1) the employer may petition the Board for a review of the
election process within five days after an election, 2) the Board
"shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the election
shall be certified," and 3) the Board may certify or refuse to
certify the results." Judicial review of a Board order is provided
by section 1160.8 that states, in part: "Any person aggrieved
by the final order of the board. . . may obtain a review of such
order in the court of appeal . ... 27 The problem is that a
Board certification is not considered a "final order" within the
meaning of the Act,28 and therefore, an employer must first
commit an unfair labor practice and be adjudged guilty of the
violation in order to be "aggrieved by the final order of the
board . . . ." At that point, the court of appeal is expected to
review the entire process including the certification procedure.
This is also true under the NLRA.29
In order to obtain judicial review of a Board certification,
an employer can commit what has been referred to under the
NLRA as a "technical" refusal to bargain (i.e., the employer
simply refuses to negotiate with the certified bargaining repre-
sentative). Then, the employer is found to be in violation of the
Act, is ordered to cease and desist from further unfair labor
23. No. 77-CE-33-1-D, slip op. at 21 (appended to 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44 (July 13,
1978)).
24. Other refusal-to-bargain cases that were, at the time, pending before the
ALRB included: Romar Carrot Co., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 56 (Aug. 18, 1978); Perry Farms,
Inc., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25 (Apr. 26, 1978); and Adam Dairy, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 (Apr. 26,
1978).
25. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.8 (West Supp. 1979).
26. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.3(c) (West Supp. 1979).
27. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.8 (West Supp. 1979).
28. Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony, 66 Cal. App. 3d 781, 136 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1977).
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c), (d), 160(e), (f) (1976).
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practices, and finally (at least in the experience of the ALRB
to date) he is ordered to make employees whole for losses occa-
sioned by his unlawful refusal to bargain." At this point, the
employer "may obtain a review of such order in the court of
appeal ... ."31 Despite the foregoing, when Superior Farming
reached the Board, the ALO's analysis of the applicability of
make-whole was rejected by a majority of the Board members
voting, member McCarthy dissenting."
The argument against any wholesale application of make-
whole is, that since the employer must commit a violation of'
section 1153(e) in order to challenge Board certification in the
courts, it is unfair and in contravention of the underlying pur-
poses of the Act3 to chill the exercise of this right to judicial
review by holding the threat of make-whole over the head of the
employer who in good faith seeks to have certification re-
viewed."
NLRA Precedent
It is precisely this argument that created a stir among
commentators, jurists, and the NLRB about a decade ago.3"
The problem was stated in terms of the lack of remedial power
afforded the NLRB in cases where an employer sought to un-
dermine or defeat a union by delaying the bargaining process
as long as possible. One method used by the recalcitrant em-
ployer was to drag the certification procedure through the
courts.37 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
30. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1979).
31. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.8 (West Supp. 1979).
32. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44 (July 13, 1978).
33. The California Supreme Court noted in ALRB v. Superior Court: "This
enactment is intended to bring certainty and a sense of fair play to a presently unstable
and potentially volatile condition in the state." 16 Cal. 3d at 398, 546 P.2d at 691, 128
Cal. Rptr. at 187 (citing to the preamble of the ALRA).
34. Superior Farming Co., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44, slip op. at 13-14 (McCarthy, dis-
senting).
35. See, e.g., Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB (Tiidee
Prod., Inc.), 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970); Tiidee Prod.,
Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 158 (1972); Tiidee Prod., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972); Ex-Cell-
0 Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970) (former NLRB Member Gerald A. Brown, dissenting
in Ex-CeU-O, is the present chairperson of the ALRB); Note, An Assessment of the
Proposed "Make-Whole" Remedy In Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, 67 MICH. L. REV. 374
(1968).
36. 185 N.L.R.B. at 108.
37. Id.
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v. NLRB (Tiidee Products), decided that the NLRB had the
power to make employees whole in such a case" even though
power to grant the remedy was not explicit in the statute." The
issue was then narrowed to the quality of the employer's chal-
lenge to NLRB certification (i.e., his "legal" reasons for com-
mitting the "technical" refusal to bargain). The court of ap-
peals decided that the test for the application of the make-
whole remedy in such cases should turn on whether the em-
ployer's challenge could be said to have been "frivolous" or
debatable." On remand to the NLRB, this standard was con-
sidered unworkable, and in view of the lack of express statutory
authority from the Congress to grant make-whole, the national
board declined to award the remedy at all.'
Superior Farming's Refusal to Bargain
In his recommendation in Superior Farming, the ALO
pointed out that the respondent's election objections could not
be deemed insubstantial or frivolous and that this claim had
already been recognized by the ALRB:
The election at Superior Farming was one of the largest
elections conducted by the Fresno Regional Office during
the early days of our Act. Numerous problems were en-
countered resulting in confusion and some degree of chaos
during the course of the election. Many of the problems
might have been averted had the Board agents and parties
been more experienced in conducting elections of this
type ...
The parties spent much time and effort at the hearing
and in their briefs detailing the alleged misconduct. Were
we willing to adopt per se rules we would be compelled to
set this election aside.42
Drawing from the court of appeals' position in Tiidee Products
and from the ALRB's findings of election irregularities, the
38. 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
39. Compare CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1979) with 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1976).
40. The court of appeals held that the make-whole remedy is appropriate where
the refusal to bargain is premised on objections to an election that are patently frivo-
lous and intended simply to delay collective bargaining. 426 F.2d at 1248.
41. 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972). See also Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. at 109.
42. No. CE-33-1-D, slip op. at 20 (appended to 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44 (July 13, 1978))
(quoting Superior Farming Co., 3 A.L.R.B. No. 35, slip op. at 2-3 (Apr. 20, 1978))
(emphasis added).
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ALO concluded that, because it had not acted in bad faith,
Superior Farming should not be liable for a make-whole order
simply because it had refused to bargain in order to challenge
the certification. 43
Subjective Bad Faith
There is additional confusion on the threshold question of
the employer's good faith or bad faith as it pertains to make-
whole. Initially, it is interesting to note the difference in the
language of the NLRA and that of the ALRA in regard to the
unfair labor practice "refusal to bargain." Section 8(a) of the
NLRA states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer . . .(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the repre-
sentatives of his employees. . . ."44 Section 1153 of the ALRA
reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an agricultural em-
ployer to do any of the following: ...(e) To refuse to
bargain collectively in good faith with labor orgainizations
certified pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 5 .... "I'
In order to supply the requirement to bargain "in good faith"
to section 8(a)(5) of the national act, one must look to section
8(d). 46 Thus, the ALRA appears to stipulate (and the ALRB
has so reasoned) that there cannot be a good-faith, unlawful
refusal to bargain since the words "good faith" are included in
the very definition of the unfair labor practice.4 1
In Tiidee Products, the court of appeals recognized a dis-
tinction between an employer seeking judicial review of an
NLRB certification on at least fairly debatable grounds and
similar employer challenges where the grounds were
"frivolous" or insubstantial. 48 Since the ALRB is directed to
43. Id. at 21.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976).
45. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1153 (West Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
46. NLRA § 8(d) provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the per-
formance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative
of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment . . .
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
47. Therefore, one cannot commit a refusal to bargain that contravenes that
section of the ALRA and still exhibit good faith.
48. See note 40 supra.
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follow NLRA precedent whenever applicable,4" it is arguable
that the Board should exercise its discretion and refuse to
apply make-whole in situations where an employer challenges
certification on other than frivolous or insubstantial grounds
and thus exhibits subjective good faith while violating the let-
ter of section 1153(e).
The conclusion that the remedy should not be applied in
these good-faith, technical refusal-to-bargain cases is sup-
ported by a portion of the testimony of then Secretary of Agri-
culture Rose Bird during a hearing before the California Senate
Industrial Relations Committee ° prior to the enactment of the
ALRA. In response to an inquiry5' regarding the meaning and
reach of the make-whole provision of section 1160.3, Ms. Bird
said:
[T]his language was just placed in because there has been
a good deal of discussion with the National Labor Rela-
tions Act that it ought to be amended to allow the "make
whole" remedy, and this is something that the people who
have looked at this Act carefully believe is a progressive
step and should be taken. . . . Now, what we're talking
here is only where an employer bargains in bad faith. You
make whole the employee with backpay, and that's all
we're talking about.5"
Ms. Bird also remarked, "What it [the ALRA] is doing here
is giving discretion to the board to give backpay to employees
where there has been bad faith, and I suggest that's an equita-
ble remedy."53 In response to a further inquiry 4 concerning the
Board's discretion in remedying unfair labor practices, Ms.
Bird (apparently making reference to the Board's discretion to
award make-whole specifically) stated, "[Wihat I'm saying is
that the board has to be convinced of the matter [presumably
that the employer had exhibited bad faith] .... , But later,
49. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1148 (West Supp. 1979).
50. Public Hearing on S.B. I Before the Senate Industrial Relations Committee
of the California State Legislature, 3d Extraordinary Sess. (1975).
51. The question was propounded by Jordan Bloom, who was present at the
hearing on behalf of the Mid-Valley Labor Relations, Central California Farmers'
Association and Harry Kubo.
52. Public Hearing on S.B. I Before the Senate Industrial Relations Committee
of the California State Legislature, 3d Extraordinary Sess. 64-65 (1975) (emphasis
added).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 65-66.
55. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
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Ms. Bird summarized her position with regard to make-whole
saying, "It's merely within its [the Board's] power to give
backpay where there has been a failure to bargain in good
faith." 'Although this final remark seems to be a clear, unem-
bellished statement of section 1160.3 (as it pertains to make-
whole), it is at least arguable that Ms. Bird implied there must
be a showing of subjective bad faith on the part of the employer
before it can be ordered to make employees whole for its unlaw-
ful refusal to bargain.
The ALO in Superior Farming attempted to further sub-
stantiate his position by connecting Ms. Bird's remarks to an
article written by Herman M. Levy, a law professor and con-
sultant employed in drafting the ALRA.5 7
Although the question of whether Congress granted
this power [the make-whole remedy] to the NLRB is still
debated by some labor lawyers, there is no doubt that the
ALRA has given this potent remedy to the ALRB. The
grant of power, however, is tempered by the phrase "when
the board deems such relief appropriate." The board is not
likely to use this remedial power in every refusal to bargain
case, but the fact that it is available may cause employers
to be more cautious in refusing to bargain for insubstantial
or frivolous reasons. 58
Member McCarthy, dissenting in Superior Farming,
seems to be in accord. Citing his concurring opinion in Perry
Farms (companion to Adam Dairy), McCarthy stated:
I continue to oppose the majority's nonselective applica-
tion of the make-whole remedy. . . .Respondent herein
has in good faith pursued the only lawful means by
which it may place a legally and factually debatable claim
before the courts of appeal."
Later in his dissent, Mr. McCarthy pointed up what he per-
ceived to be the other major deficiency in the Board's applica-
tion of make-whole. He argued that, without applying the
good-faith/bad-faith criterion to its use of the make-whole rem-
edy in refusal-to-bargain cases like Superior Farming, the
56. Id. at 67.
57. Herman M. Levy is presently a professor of law at the University of Santa
Clara School of Law.
58. No. 77-CE-33-1-D, slip op. at 16 n.13 (appended to 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44 (July
13, 1978)) (citing Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975-La Esperanza
de California Para El Futuro, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 783, 803 (1975)).
59. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44, slip op. at 12 (McCarthy, dissenting) (emphasis added).
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ALRB is abusing its discretion.10 This stance is grounded in the
precedent of the NLRA discussed above' and in McCarthy's
interpretation of the discretionary language of section
1160.3-that is, "when the board deems such relief appropri-
ate."
Mr. McCarthy contends that the Adam Dairy and Perry
Farms method of applying make-whole impermissibly renders
the above-quoted language of section 1160.3 surplusage.2 The
argument is not without appeal since the majority in Perry
Farms held the remedy applicable in any case in which em-
ployees suffer a loss of pay as a result of an employer's refusal
to bargain.13 Moreover, the Board has given no indication that
circumstances exist where a make-whole order will not issue
following an unlawful refusal to bargain. In his dissent in
Superior Farming, McCarthy points out that make-whole is an
equitable remedy and that "the equities in a refusal to bargain.
situation do not always preponderate in favor of the employ-
ees." 4 Thus, when an employer presses for judicial review of a
colorable claim in opposition to Board certification, McCarthy
concludes that the equities may weigh in that employer's
favor. 5
SECTION 1155.2 AND MAKE-WHOLE
Another challenge to the ALRB's present policy of award-
ing make-whole has been extrapolated from the very provisions
of the Act that define and clarify the duty to bargain in good
faith. Section 1155.2 states that the obligation to bargain
collectively in good faith is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the agricul-
tural employer and the representative of the agricultural
employees to meet at reasonnable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment ...but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession."6
60. Id. at 13.
61. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra.
62. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25, slip op. at 26 (McCarthy, dissenting).
63. Id. at 9.
64. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44, slip op. at 13 (McCarthy, dissenting).
65. Id. at 15.
66. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1155.2 (West Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
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This section of the ALRA is nearly identical to section 8(d) of
the NLRA, again significant in view of ALRA section 1148. The
essence of the criticism is that, in awarding make-whole, the
Board has overreached its authority because it is, in effect,
compelling agreement and requiring concessions (at least with
respect to worker compensation) for the period of the em-
ployer's unlawful refusal to bargain.A7 If the Board is overreach-
ing, one must ask what the legislature intended since it granted
the ALRB the authority to make employees whole on the one
hand, while at the same time it restricted the Board from inter-
vening in the negotiation of specific terms and conditions of
employment.
Since section 1155.2(a) is so similar to section 8(d) of the
national labor act, a brief review of NLRA precedent is again
in order. The NLRB has sought to foster an atmosphere for
collective bargaining between employees and employers which
is as unburdened as possible by governmental interference. The
national board and the courts have consistently affirmed the
concept that the negotiating process should reflect pressures of
the marketplace in a free enterprise system. In NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., the Supreme Court said,
The theory of the [Wagner] Act is that free opportunity
for negotiation with accredited representatives of employ-
ees is likely to promote industrial peace and, may bring
about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in
itself does not attempt to compel."
More recently, in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, the Court elabo-
rated:
But it was recognized from the beginning that agreement
might in some cases be impossible, and it was never in-
tended that the government would in such cases step in,
become a party to the negotiations and impose its own
views of a desirable settlement."
Another cogent statement of the problem posed by section
1155.2 appeared in the recommendation of the ALO in Superior
Farming:
In other words, employees do not automatically achieve
greater benefits from an employer's timely compliance
67. See notes 70-76 and accompanying text infra.
68. 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
69. 397 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1970).
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with his bargaining obligation where their employer en-
gages in hard but lawful bargaining. Furthermore, al-
though the General Counsel asserts that every UFW con-
tract results in greater benefits, evidence in the instant
proceeding does not compel that as an inevitable conclu-
sion with respect to the Respondent, a company which
purportedly prides itself already in maintaining premium
wages and working conditions for its employees.'
Member McCarthy recognized the potential conflict be-
tween the remedy and section 1155.2 in his concurring opinion
in the Perry Farms decision. He noted, "[Tihe make whole
remedy tends to establish terms of a collective bargaining
agreement which, even in the absence of a refusal to bargain,
might never have come into existence.""
Although the Board contends that make-whole in these
circumstances is not contrary to section 1155.2,2 the method of
calculation of the award in Adam Dairy and the other make-
whole cases indicates some erosion of the principle stated in
sections 1155.2(a) and 8(d). 3 Essentially, the Board is looking
to other agricultural employee contracts to determine the aver-
age negotiated wage rates." Then, the ALRB orders the em-
ployer to make employees whole for the "net" difference be-
tween the basic wage rate in effect at the time of the unfair
labor practice and the average negotiated wage. 5 The value of
fringe benefits is also added to this figure. 6
It is not within the scope of this comment to fully explore
all of the aspects of the method selected to effectuate the make-
whole remedy but it seems that the Board has, on balance,
intruded into an area protected by section 1155.2. However, the
legislature has clearly authorized the ALRB to make employees
whole in refusal-to-bargain situations. It remains to be deter-
mined whether this intrusion should be restricted by the
courts.
70. No. 77-CE-33-1-D, slip op. at 11 (appended to 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44 (July 13,
1978)).
71. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25, slip op. at 26-27 (McCarthy, concurring).
72. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24, slip op. at 11.
73. Id. at 18-29.
74. The Board looked to 37 United Farm Workers' (UFW) contracts negotiated
pursuant to ALRA certifications, 36 of which were concluded during the 12-month
period following the UFW's certification as the bargaining agent for the employees of
Adam Dairy. Id.
75. Id. at 20.
76. Id. at 24-29.
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How then, in light of all the foregoing criticism, does the
ALRB justify its application of make-whole "in any case in
which employees suffer a loss of pay as a result of an employer's
refusal to bargain"?" More specifically, how convincing are the
Board's arguments in a situation like Superior Farming where
the employer "technically" violates section 1153(e) to obtain
judicial review of his objections to the Board's certification
process?
THE PROPER APPLICATION OF MAKE-WHOLE-A
DEFENSE OF ALRB POLICY
The position of the ALRB with regard to make-whole as
announced in Adam Dairy and Perry Farms is correct. The
remedy, as provided in section 1160.3 of the Act, is properly
applied in any case where an employer unlawfully refuses to
bargain and the employees suffer economic loss thereby. Each
of the aforementioned criticisms of the Board's policy, al-
though thought-provoking, can be convincingly answered.
The Right of the Employer to Judicial Review Is Not
Impermissibly Chilled By Make-Whole
Very simply stated, every litigant is aware of the possibil-
ity that his cause might be a losing one. To toll the period for
which make-whole is granted during the pendency of any judi-
cial challenge to Board certification is illogical and would be
prejudicial to the basic, underlying purposes of the Act. Sec-
tion 1140.2 provides:
It is hereby stated to be the policy of the State of California
to encourage and protect the right of agricultural employ-
ees to full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment,
and to be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion
of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of'
such representatives or in self-organization or in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. For this purpose this part
is adopted to provide for collective bargaining rights for
agricultural employees. 8
77. Id. at 6.
78. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140.2 (West Supp. 1979).
[Vol. 191106
THE MAKE-WHOLE REMEDY
And, as the court noted in ALRB v. Superior Court: "This
enactment is intended to bring certainty and a sense of fair
play to a presently unstable and potentially volatile condition
in the state."79
In addition, it is a primary contention of the ALRB that
the remedy is an equitable remedy, compensatory in nature."
When an employer refuses to bargain for whatever reason, the
employees are denied the opportunity to better their lot
through collective bargaining. If the employer is finally found
to have unlawfully refused to bargain, the equities would seem
to clearly favor the aggrieved employees who have done nothing
wrong. Otherwise, the employer is unjustly enriched by a delay
that allows him to continue paying lower wages and also weak-
ens his union adversary.
Discretion, Bad Faith, and NLRA Precedent
The Board has discretion to apply the remedy in all cases
where employees are harmed as a result of an employer's un-
lawful refusal to bargain including an employer's "technical"
violation intended solely to obtain judicial review of a Board
certification. Discretion does not imply that there must first be
a finding of bad faith on the part of the employer. Furthermore,
the NLRB make-whole cases are not applicable since the
NLRB clearly lacks the express authority to order the remedy.
In Ex-Cell-O Corp., the NLRB refused to grant the make-
whole remedy even though the court of appeals found the power
to grant such relief to be implicit in the national act." The
NLRB decided that a standard whereby challenges to Board
certification would be categorized as either "frivolous" or de-
batable was unworkable.2
It has been argued that the language of section 1160.3,
giving the ALRB discretion to order make-whole, implicitly
requires that the Board use some sort of a standard similar to
that proposed by the court in Tiidee Products." There are two
responses here. First, the NLRB has never been granted the
express power to make employees whole in circumstances
79. 16 Cal. 3d at 398, 546 P.2d at 691, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (citing to the
preamble of the ALRA).
80. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25, slip op. at 10-11.
81. 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Auto Workers v.
NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
82. 185 N.L.R.B. at 109.
83. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 44, slip op. at 14 n.2 (McCarthy, dissenting).
1979] 1107
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
where an employer has refused to bargain in order to challenge
a certification of that board. Therefore, section 1148 of the
ALRA ("The board shall follow applicable precedents of the
[NLRA] .. .,") does not require an application of NLRA
precedent since there is none. Second, if either the NLRB or
the ALRB were to utilize a standard of good-faith/bad-faith
with such "technical" refusals to bargain, each would seem to
be in direct contravention of a longstanding mandate of' the
United States Supreme Court disallowing any punitive power
to the national labor board. The "authority to order affirmative
action does not go so far as to confer a punitive jurisdiction...
even though the Board [NLRB]" may feel that the "policies
of the Act [NLRA] might be effectuated" thereby." And
again, in Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, the Court held that
Board remedies must be remedial and cannot constitute a pen-
alty or fine. 6 A two-part test to determine the character of an
NLRB order was used by the Supreme Court in Local 60,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB.57 Simply stated,
the test is: 1) Does the Board order remove the consequences
of the violation? 2) Does it dissipate the effects of the unfair
labor practice?"8 In the ALRA context, make-whole awards
compensate the employees for a lost opportunity to bargain,
prevent the employer from reaping the side benefit of a weak-
ened union following unlawful delaying tactics, and are not
impermissibly punitive since they do not distinguish between
employers acting in good faith and those whose conduct mani-
fests bad faith.
At least one commentator has recognized that the applica-
tion of a good-faith/bad-faith distinction to an NLRB award
may substantiate a claim that the award is improperly punitive
rather than remedial. Therefore, even if the court of appeals
decision in Tiidee Products was "applicable precedent," it
would still seem improper for the ALRB to "punish" the em-
ployer who challenges Board certification on frivolous or insub-
stantial grounds. On the whole, the compensation rationale of
the ALRB, whereby it does not make a good-faith/bad-faith
84. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1148 (West Supp. 1979).
85. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938).
86. 311 U.S. 7, 10-11 (1940).
87. 365 U.S. 651 (1971).
88. Id. at 655.
89. St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REV.
1039, 1043 (1968).
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distinction, is preferable.
Rose Bird's remarks before the Senate Industrial Relations
Committee" do not constitute a bar to the ALRB's policy of
awarding make-whole. Even if we were to read her testimony
as a clear indication of the manner in which she thought the
Board would exercise its discretion, that testimony, informal as
it was, should not be weighted more heavily than traditional
rules of statutory interpretation. The majority opinion of the
Board in Perry Farms reiterated the principles of interpretation
as reviewed by the appellate court in Steilberg v. Lackner:
In determining the legislative intent, the court turns first
to the words used in the statute. . . .The words, however,
must be read in context, keeping in mind the nature and
obvious purpose of the statute . . . , and the statutory
language applied must be given such interpretation as will
promote rather than defeat the objective and policy of the
law . . . . Finally, in ascertaining legislative intent, the
courts should consider not only the words used, but should
also take into account other matters, such as the object in
view, the evils to be remedied, the history" of the times,
legislation upon the same subject, public policy and con-
temporaneous construction ..
Nor is this criticism of the Board's policy enhanced by connect-
ing Ms. Bird's statements to the Levy article discussed above."
Mr. Levy, referring to the grant of power to award make-whole
contained in section 1160.3 of the ALRA said, "The board is not
likely to use this remedial power in every refusal to bargain
. ... .,, It would be reading something extra into Mr. Levy's
article to interpret the foregoing to in any way limit the ALRB's
discretion to invoke the make-whole remedy.
Board policy does not render the discretionary language of
section 1160.3 surplusage. Although the Board has decided to
award make-whole in all cases where an employer has unlaw-
fully refused to bargain and employees have been harmed
thereby, this does not mean that the application of the remedy
is per se nonselective. Clearly, the announced plan to imple-
ment the remedy 4 is an exercise of discretion. The Board has
90. See notes 50-56 and accompanying text supra.
91. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25, slip op. at 14 (quoting from 69 Cal. App. 3d 780, 785, 138
Cal. Rptr. 378, 381 (1977)) (internal citations omitted).
92. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24, slip op. at 6.
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implicitly said that, in cases where the employees are not
harmed, the award will not be forthcoming. This claim of im-
plication may sound spurious, but if the economic climate in
California agriculture changes so that collective bargaining is
not working an economic benefit for agricultural employees,
the Board would have no reason to grant compensation to those
whose employer had refused to bargain. It may be that a case
will emerge where the period in which the employees were de-
nied the right to bargain is so short that the employees will not
have been harmed economically by the delay. In any event, it
is improper to conclude that the Board has abused its discre-
tion or has rendered the discretionary language of section
1160.3 surplusage simply because it has so far failed to find for
an employer on the issue of make-whole following an unlawful
refusal to bargain.
ALRA Section 1155.2(a) and Make-Whole
The award of make-whole does not impermissibly contra-
vene that part of section 1155.2(a) that provides: "[B]ut such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession." 5
It is difficult to deny that an award of back pay based on
an industry-wide average negotiated wage does, in effect, write
substantive contract terms for the period in which the em-
ployer unlawfully refuses to bargain. And although there are
those who argue that, statistically, employers who come to the
negotiating table are very likely to reach some sort of an agree-
ment with their employees," it is clear that some who bargain
do not reach a contract. 7
There are, however, two major flaws in the argument that
the ALRB's system of compensating employees does too much
violence to the specific restrictions of section 1155.2(a) and the
long and unbroken line of authority interpreting the parallel
NLRA section 8(d).
First, unlike the Congress of the United States, the Cali-
fornia Legislature has clearly authorized the make-whole rem-
95. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1152.5(a) (West Supp. 1979).
96. See Ross, Analysis of Administrative Process Under Taft-Hartley, 1966 LAB.
REL. YEARBOOK 299, 306 (1966).
97. The problems inherent in one side's use of statistical evidence to prove the
validity of its position were reviewed in People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33,
66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968), a criminal case in which the conviction was overturned
because of the prejudicial effect of statistical evidence offered by the prosecution.
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edy in any refusal-to-bargain case. Thus, the major hurdle that
restrains the NLRB is overcome." The legislature would not
have enacted two sections of the ALRA that were mutually
exclusive. Second, the facts of H.K. Porter and the other au-
thority detailing the prohibition contained in section 8(d) of
the NLRA are distinguishable. In each instance where the
NLRB was found to have overreached its authority, it had
ordered an employer to include a specific term or terms within
the contract negotiated by the parties." In the ALRB cases, the
remedy takes on the characteristics of compensation for an
injury sustained, and that remedy ceases at the point at which
the employer begins to bargain in good faith.""' There is no
intrusion into the guarded sphere of private negotiations since
there are no negotiations taking place. The majority in Adam
Dairy did not find the award of make-whole to be contrary to
the language of section 1155.2(a) stating:
Instead, we read these provisions [1160.3 and 1155.2(a)],
taken together, to authorize the Board to assess a make-
whole remedy for periods in which an employer refuses to
bargain in good faith and to order good faith bargaining in
the future, without imposing a requirement that the par-
ties reach a contract . . . . We also read these two sec-
tions as a directive to fashion a make-whole remedy which
is minimally intrusive into the bargaining process and
which encourages the resumption of that process.'"'
The Board does not deny that there is a tension between
sections 1155.2(a) and 1160.3.1"° The reach of these two provi-
sions of the Act should therefore be examined in light of the
purposes of the Act'03 and the principles of equity. Both seem
to weigh in favor of the aggrieved employees.
98. See note 6 supra.
99. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), where an employer,
engaged in collective bargaining, delayed the final negotiation of a contract by refusing
to grant the union a clause providing for the checkoff of union dues. The NLRB order
requiring the employer to include the disputed clause in its contract with the union
was held to be outside the power of the NLRA.
100. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24, slip op. at 34.
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id.
103. In Va. Elec. and Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943), the Supreme
Court fashioned a test for the NLRB regarding the maximum reach of its remedial
powers. The test was whether the remedy could be shown to be "a patent attempt to
achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the
Act." Id. at 540. Section 1140.2 of the ALRA states:
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CONCLUSION
Many commentators have decried the lack of' effective
remedies as the greatest single weakness of an otherwise vener-
able National Labor Relations Act.'04 In California, the framers
of the ALRA saw an opportunity to provide for a more perfect
balance in the area of agricultural labor relations in the state.
The Act provides for more democracy within labor organiza-
tions,'"5 recognizes the homogeneity of California farm labor-
ers,106 and seeks to promote dignity for agricultural employees.
The boldness with which the ALRB is dealing with a decided
inequity in our social order through its use of the make-whole
remedy is both laudable and within the bounds of the Act.
John A. Schlosser
It is hereby stated to be the policy of the State of California to
encourage and protect the right of agricultural employees to full freedom
of association, self.organization, and designation of representatives of'
their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment, and to be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of em-
ployers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives
or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of'
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. For this purpose
this part is adopted to provide for collective-bargaining rights for agricul-
tural employees.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140.2 (West Supp. 1979).
104. See, e.g., Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in
Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1059.(1968); St. Antoine, supra note 89;
Note, NLRB Attorneys'Fees Awards: An Inadequate Remedy for Refusals to Bargain,
63 GEO. L.J. 955 (1975); Note, NLRB Power to Award Damages in Unfair Labor
Practice Cases, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1670 (1971).
105. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1153(c) (West Supp. 1979).
106. Prior to the enactment of the ALRA, existing law provided for workers'
rights within the state but did not contain provisions specifically relating to agricul-
tural labor relations and agricultural employees.
